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The ERA: The Task Ahead
by Leo Kanowitz*

Introduction
Seven years ago this week, on March 22, 1972, the United States
Congress adopted a joint resolution proposing the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) to the Federal Constitution and setting a sevenyear limit within which the necessary thirty-eight state legislative ratifications were to have occurred.1 As you all know, when it became clear
to the ERA's supporters last year that those ratifications would not be
forthcoming by the original deadline, they successfully persuaded Con-

gress to extend it by an additional thirty-nine months.' Because this
week marks the original deadline, and the Amendment has still not
been ratified,3 I thought it appropriate to use this occasion to review the
* Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. A.B., 1947, City
College of the City University of New York; J.D., 1960, University of California, Berkeley;
LL.M., 1967, J.S.D., 1969, Columbia University.
This article is based on a speech delivered by the author on March 20, 1979 at New
Mexico State University where he was serving, from March 14th to March 31st, as a Distinguished Visiting Professor.
1. See S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971), 86 Stat. 1523.
2. See Note, The Amending Process: Extending the Ratfcaion Deadline of the Proposed EqualRights Amendment, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 91 (1978).
3. As of the date this speech was given, thirty-five states had ratified the ERA. Only
one state, Indiana, has given its ratification within the last four years, while five states, including Indiana, have "rescinded" their ratifications.
States ratifying the ERA are:
March 22, 1972
Hawaii
March 23, 1972
Delaware
March 23, 1972
New Hampshire
March 24, 1972
Idaho
March 28, 1972
Kansas
March 29, 1972
Nebraska
April 4, 1972
Tennessee
April 5, 1972
Alaska
April 14, 1972
Rhode Island
April 17, 1972
New Jersey
April 19, 1972
Texas
April 21, 1972
Iowa
April 21, 1972
Colorado
April 22, 1972
West Virginia
April 26, 1972
Wisconsin
May 3, 1972
New York
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campaign for the Amendment to date.
I want to discuss what has impeded the ratification efforts up to
now, and what can be done to assure that the Amendment will be ratified within the extended period that Congress has granted. In particular, I would like to explore the following questions: 1) What have been
the positive results in the campaign to this point that has brought the

ERA so close to ratification despite its highly controversial implications? 2) What mistakes have been made in that campaign? 3) How
can they be avoided in future efforts on behalf of ERA ratification?

I.

Background: The Perceived Need

In addressing these questions, one has to begin with the state of

affairs that led initially to the perceived need for an Equal Rights
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.4 It will come as no great revMichigan
May 22, 1972
Maryland
May 26, 1972
Massachusetts
June 21, 1972
Kentucky
June 26, 1972
Pennsylvania
September 26, 1972
California
November 13, 1972
Wyoming
January 26, 1973
South Dakota
February 5, 1973
Oregon
February 8, 1973
Minnesota
February 12, 1973
New Mexico
February 28, 1973
Vermont
March 1, 1973
Connecticut
March 15, 1973
Washington
March 27, 1973
Maine
January 18, 1974
Montana
January 25, 1974
Ohio
February 7, 1974
North Dakota
February 3, 1975
Indiana
January 18, 1977
[1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 349.
States "rescinding" ratification are: Idaho, Indiana, Nebraska, Tennessee and Kentucky, although Kentucky's rescission was vetoed by the state's acting governor.
For the position that rescissions are invalid, see Kanowitz & Klinger, Can a State Rescind Its EqualRights Amendment Ratfeation: Who Decides and How. 28 HASTINGS LJ.
979 (1977). But see, Rhodes & Mabile, Ratfcatiaon of Proposed Federal Constitutional
Amendments-The States May Rescind, 45 TENN. L. REv. 703 (1978). The question of the
constitutionality of rescission has generated much discusssion. See generally, Burke, Validity
ofAttempts to Rescind Ratifcation of the EqualRights Amendment, 8 U.W. LA. L. Rnv. I
(1976); Heckman, Ratfcation Of A ConstitutionalAmendment: Can .4 State Change Its
Mind?, 6 CONN. L. REv. 28 (1973); Note, The Equal Rights Amendment: Will States Be
Allowed to Change Their Minds?, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW 657 (1974); Comment, Constitutional Amendments-The Justiciabilityof Ratifcation and Retraction, 41 TENN. L. REv. 93
(1973).
4. See generally L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REvOLUTION (1969) [hereinafter cited as KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW]; Brown, Emerson,
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elation that on a social level in the United States, as in other countries,
men and women have been assigned specific roles solely on the basis of
their sex. That such an assignment has been arbitrary and bears no
relationship to the abilities, desires, and hopes of individual men and

women has long been evident to most people who have thought about
the matter.
But as long as discriminatory treatment of the sexes occurred
strictly in the private, social sphere, relatively little could be done about
it. I say "relatively" because governments could have acted as they
have done in recent years, under the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution5 or the inherent police power of the states,6 to prohibit
such discrimination even in the private sphere. But this kind of deci-

sion requires a heightened level of commitment to the eradication of
sex discrimination. It requires new, positive acts by either the federal
or state legislatures, or both, acts that can be induced only if the right

combination of political circumstances and pressures converge and are
felt.
By contrast, when social prejudices about the appropriate roles of
the sexes are translated into government action, with the result that
laws-whether in the form of statutes, or of decisions by courts or adminstrative agencies-accord one kind of official treatment to
men and
another to women, the validity of such differential treatment is immedi-

ately suspect in the light of various constitutional restraints on governmental power.' Those restraints flow from the two privileges and
immunities clauses, which require respect for rights inhering in state
and federal citizenship;' the due process clauses of the Fifth9 and FourFalk & Freedman, The EqualRights.Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasisforEqualRightsfor
Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
5. See cases discussed at note 60 infra.
6. See, e.g., California Fair Employment Practices Act, CAL. LABOR CODE § 1411, et
seq. (West 1978). Section 1411 prohibits discrimination in employment on the grounds, inter
alia, of sex. The law was upheld as a valid exercise of the state police power in Northern
Inyo Hosp. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 38 Cal. App. 3d 14, 112 Cal. Rptr. 872
(1974).
7. For discussions of the constitutional aspects of sex discriminatory laws, see, e.g.,
Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REv. 451 (1978); Ginsburg, Gender
andthe Constitution,44 U. CINN. L. REV. 1 (1975); Lombard, Sex: A Classfcationin Search
of Strict Scrutiny, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1355 (1975); Note, Sex Discriminationand EqualProtectio" The Questionof a Suspect Classpication,5 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1975).
8. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. I provides: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ I provides, in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ....
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any person.., be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
" The due process
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teenth Amendments;1 0 and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. '

That sex discriminatory laws existed and still exist is now probably
a matter of common knowledge. When the congressional joint declara-

tion sending the ERA on its ratification road was first passed in 1972,
thousands of laws in the states and at the federal level drew sharp dis-

tinctions between the sexes on the basis of widely-held, but questionable assumptions and generalizations about them. Some made the
husband the head and master of the family.' 2 Many required wives to

assume their husbands' surnames and lose their own.'3 Others granted
preferences to mothers over fathers in disputes involving the custody of
minor children."

Still others gave husbands superior rights to manage

provision of this amendment has been held to embody an equal protection guarantee as
against the federal government, Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 182 n.1 (1976); Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State
"
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
12. See, e.g., former CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 156, 172 and 172a. § 156 provided: "The husband is the head of the family. He may choose any reasonable place or mode of living, and
the wife must conform thereto." § 172 provided: 'The husband has the management and
control of the community personal property, with like absolute power of disposition, other
than testamentary, as he has of his separate estate;provided,however, that he can not make a
gift of such community personal property. . . without a valuable consideration. . . without
the written consent of the wife." § 172a similarly gave the husband management and control of the community real property. (West 1954).
§ 156 was finally repealed effective Jan. 1, 1975. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5101. Sections replacing § 172 and § 172a now provide for common control of community property. CAL.
Cry. CODE §§ 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1978) (effective Jan. 1, 1975).
13. See, e.g., Forbush v. Wallace, 405 U.S. 970 (1972), atg,341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D.
Ala. 1971). Based on Alabama's common law rule that the husband's surname is the wife's
legal name, the district court upheld an unwritten regulation of the Department of Public
Safety which required each married female to use her husband's surname in applying for
and obtaining a drivers' license. The court found that the state's interest in preserving the
integrity of identification and drivers' records through licenses was a significant state interest. Requiring married females to use the husband's surname was found to be reasonably
related to that end. Id. 221-22. The Supreme Court affirmed without opinion.
14. See, e.g., Juri v. Juri, 69 Cal. App. 2d 773, 160 P.2d 73 (1945). Upholding the custody award of the former marriage's two offspring to the wife, the California court of appeal
cited former CAL. Cry. CODE § 138(2) (West 1954), which provided, in pertinent part: "other
things being equal, if the child is of tender years, custody should be given to the mother, if
the child is of an age to require education and preparation for labor or business, then custody should be given to the father." Former § 138 was replaced by CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600
(West Supp. 1978) (amended 1970), which abolishes both statutory preferences. The Juri
court observed: "'it is not open to question, and indeed it is universally recognized, that the
mother is the natural custodian of her young. This view proceeds on the well known fact that
there is no satisfactory substitute for a mother's love."' 69 Cal. App. 2d at 779, 160 P.2d at
76 (quoting Washburn v. Washburn, 49 Cal. App. 2d 581, 588, 122 P.2d 96, 100 (1942)).
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and control their wives' property. 15 Some required women to be sen-

tenced to longer prison terms than men upon conviction of the same
crime. 16 Others denied the right of women to serve on a jury. 17 Some
provided protection to women in the workplace while denying such
protection to men."8 At the federal level, only men were subject to the

obligation of compulsory military service.' 9 And women who contributed large sums to the Social Security system were denied benefits for
their spouses and children equal to those accorded men who made the

same payments. 20
The list can be enlarged. These are only examples of how the law

treated one sex less favorably than another-at times preferring the
male to the female, at other times reversing its preference. It is no sur-

prise, therefore, to learn that over the years constitutional challenges to
The bias toward awarding custody to the mother remains where the children are illegitimate. Recently the United States Supreme Court upheld a Georgia statute which recognizes
the mother as sole parent and gives to the mother all the "paternal" power. The father
challenged the statute, claiming it violated equal protection by denying him visitation rights
if his child were adopted without being legitimized. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1973).
15. See, e.g., Childs v. Charles, 46 Ga. App. 648, 168 S.E. 914 (1933) (accrued rent held
not payable to wife's estate, although title was in wife and wife contracted with the boarder,
because husband as head of the household had superior power to make contracts regarding
the property).
16. See, e.g., State v. Costello, 56 N.J. 334, 282 A.2d 748 (1971) (where females were
subject to indeterminate sentence of up to five years not reducible for continuous orderly
deportment, while males were subject to sentencing by judge for less than maximum term
and reduction for good behavior for same offense, disparate sentencing treatment impinged
on fundamental interests and state would be required to show a substantial justification for
sentencing scheme on remand).
17. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 187 So.2d 861 (1966) (exclusion of women from jury service
pursuant to statute did not deny woman defendant her right to equal protection of the law
under the 14th Amendment).
18. Among these were maximum hours laws for women, or women and minors, only,
see KANOWiTZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW, supranote 4, at 117-24, 182-88 (1969); weight-lifting
limits in employment that were applicable only to women workers, id. at 114-17; and women-only minimum wage provisions, id. at 188-92.
19. See United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Mont. 1975), rev'd,532 F.2d 673
(9th Cir. 1976) (court of appeals reversed decision wherein defendant male draftee's motion
to dismiss an indictment against him for failure to submit to induction was granted. The
district court found the sex-based classification suspect and held that the government failed
to demonstrate a compelling interest in the distinction. The draft law that inducted only
males and not females was held violative of equal protection).
20. See Weinberger v. Wiensenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (Social Security Act provision
that granted survivors' benefits based on earnings of a deceased husband and father to both
widow and minor children in her care, but granted benefits based on earnings of a deceased
wife only to the minor children and not the widower, violated the equal protection clause.
The Court held that both widows and widowers should receive support to enable them to
care for young children at home, and noted that women's earnings contribute to a family's
support as do men's, and that benefits accruing from earnings should be equal).
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such official discriminatory treatment had found their way to the
United States Supreme Court.
I will not review the many decisions of the state courts and lower
federal courts upholding sex discriminatory laws against a variety of
constitutional challenges.2 1 Suffice it to say that these decisions were
numerous and virtually unanimous in sustaining such differential treatment by government on the basis of sex. But I do want to describe four
important pre-1972 cases decided by the Supreme Court in this area, all
of which rejected constitutional challenges to official sex discrimination.
One is the crucial 1908 decision in Muller v. Oregon.2 2 In that
case, the Court upheld, as against a challenge under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state statute prescribing maximum hours for only women workers in certain kinds of employmenta statute that had been enacted without regard to the capacities of individual men and women to work beyond the maximum number of
hours it prescribed. The Court's justification for this result, when all its
rhetoric in a lengthy opinion is reduced to its essential point, was simply that women and men generally have different physiques.
In Goesaert v. Cleary,23 another case decided under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1954, the Court held
that equal protection was not violated by a state statute prohibiting women who were not related by blood or marriage to the bar owners from
working as bartenders, though the statute did not impose similar limitations on the employment rights of males who wished to pursue that
occupation.24 In still another case, Hoyt v. lorida,25 decided in 1961,
the Court again rejected an equal protection challenge to a sex-discriminatory law limiting the right of women to serve as jurors without im26
posing a similar limitation on the right of males to do so.
The case of Bradwell v. The State2 7 -although the earliest of this
group of four decisions, having been rendered by the Court in 1872-is
especially instructive. In Bradwell, the United States Supreme Court,
21. See KANOWiTZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 4, at 154-92; Note, Are Sexbased Classffcations Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw. U.L. Rav. 481 (1971); and sources
cited at note 4 supra.
22. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
23. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
24. Id. at 467.
25. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
26. Id. at 69. In 1975, relying on the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
in criminal cases, the Court held it unconstitutional to exclude women or give them automatic exemptions from jury duty based on sex. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
27. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
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rejecting challenges under the privileges and immunities clauses of the
federal constitution, upheld the right of a state to deny women, solely
on the basis of their sex, the right to practice law. 28 More important
than Bradwel's result, however, is the language employed by a concurring Justice, Mr. Justice Bradley, explaining the reasons for his vote.
As he saw it:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life. The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of
things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong, or
should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of
a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of
her husband. '
Elsewhere in his opinion, Justice Bradley noted: "The paramount
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices
of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of
civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and
cannot be based upon exceptional cases."3 In the same case, the linois Supreme Court had earlier written: "That God designed the sexes
to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to
make, apply and execute the laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic
truth.'
As charitable as one tries to be, one cannot help concluding that
the attitudes expressed in these excerpts indicate a thoughtless,
prejudiced, and reactionary view of women in society. If one is less
charitable, one is reminded by these words of Adolph Hitler's infamous
statement about the appropriate role of women in society: Kinder,
Kirche, und Kuche-Children,Church and Kitchen.
For present purposes, what is important is that despite some subtle
degrees of sophistication in the three later Supreme Court decisions alluded to above, at their core they expressed to some degree or another
the fundamentally sexist assumptions underlying Mr. Justice Bradley's
opinion in Bradwell v. The State. To be sure, they each relied on detailed analyses of the particular issues before the Court. But, especially
in view of later developments in the Court, it is clear that the results
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 139.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 141-42.
In re Bradwell, 55 I. 535, 539 (1869).
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they reached were by no means inevitable. The prevailing sexist bias of
the society at large, one has to conclude, must have played a role in the
results actually reached in those cases.
Equally important, these cases developed the doctrine that "sex is
a reasonable basis for classification." In earlier cases under the due
process and equal protection clauses, 32 the Court had in the realm of
social and economic legislation established the principle that, to pass
muster under these constitutional provisions, a law need only create a
reasonable classification designed to implement a legitimate governmental policy. Sex classification by definition thus became automatically valid.
By contrast, between the last of these four decisions3 3 and the early
1970's, the Court had developed a different standard of scrutiny under
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee for classifications characterized by the Court as "suspect"-such as those based on
race, national origin, or alienage--or for those that curbed what the
Court could characterize as a "fundamental" right of one group without curbing that same right for another group that seemed to be similarly situated. 34 In cases involving suspect classifications 35 or in those
infringing upon fundamental rights, 36 the Court imposed a greater burden of justification on one who sought to rely on the governmentallyimposed classification. It was not sufficient that the classification be
rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate governmental policy, as was true generally with regard to economic and social legislation. Rather, to pass muster the classification had to be shown to be
necessary for the achievement of an overwhelming or compelling state
interest. In this formulation "necessary" meant absolutely necessarythat is, the test would not be satisfied if less drastic alternatives would
have achieved the same ends. Similarly, what constituted a compelling
32. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); see generally, Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protectionof the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949).
33. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
34. See Forum, Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 645
(1975); see generally, Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv.
1065 (1969).
35. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state antimiscegenation laws which
discriminate on the basis of race violate the equal protection clause); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (statutes which discriminate against a class of persons because of
their national origin must be strictly scrutinized).
36. Interference with a "fundamental" right triggers a more stringent standard of review. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage is a fundamental right);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel is fundamental); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote is fundamental).
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or overwhelming state interest was also strictly construed. Once such a
test was imposed, it became obviously much more difficult for 37a racebased classification, for example, to pass constitutional muster.
In recent years, therefore, much of the effort of those bringing sex
discrimination cases before the United States Supreme Court has been
aimed at convincing the Court to adopt for sex classifications the same
heightened level of scrutiny that it now requires for racial classifications. 38 The underlying argument, of course, has been that analytically,
the fundamental social, political, and legal factors are the same in both
instances. 39 The Court's response to those efforts-and the reasons for
that response-will be dealt with below.
It was against this background of the Supreme Court's insensitivity
to the problems of sex discrimination in American law that the movement for the adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment, which began in
the early 1920's, led on March 22nd, 1972 to Congressional adoption of
a joint resolution proposing the ERA to the states for ratification.4"
The text of the Equal Rights Amendment is short and concise. It provides:
SECTION 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of sex.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
SEC.3. This amendment shall take effect two years after
the date of ratification.4 1
Despite the relative conciseness of the ERA's language, it has not
been without its interpretive problems. One view of the Amendment's
basic effect is that it would at least require the courts to treat sex-based
classifications as "suspect" in the same manner that it has treated clas37. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting):
"Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the 'compelling state interest' standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this
seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing less
than perfection." But Sf Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion
by Justice Powell: state's interest in achieving racial diversity in governmental educational
programs is compelling).
38. See, e.g., Note, Are Sex-Based ClassificationsConstitutilonallySuspect?, 66 Nw. U.L.
REv. 481, 493-95 (1971); Note, Developments in the Law-EqualProtection, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 1065, 1173-77 (1969); and note 5 supraand sources listed therein.
39. See Note, Sex Discrimination and EqualProtection: Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment, 84 HARV. L. RaV. 1499, 1507-08 (1971); sources cited at note 4 supra.
40. 188 CONG. REc. 9598 (1972).
41. See SJ. Res. 8, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), H.R.J. Res. 208, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971), 86 Stat. 1523 (1972), 118 CONG. REc. 9598 (1972).
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sifications based upon race, national origin and alienage.4 2 Another is
that the Amendment would absolutely prohibit any classification based
upon sex, except in those extremely rare instances when the matter being legislated about involves a trait present in all members of one sex
but not in any members of the other sex.43 The classic examples of
permissible sex-based classifications under such an interpretation are
those stemming from a state law that would regulate wet nurses or
sperm donors and whose reach would be limited, respectively, to women in one case and to men in the other. Except for such rare cases,
however, the Amendment would prohibit any differential treatment
based on sex. Although large numbers of individual men and women
might continue to be accorded differential treatment under law following ERA ratification, such differential treatment would be the result of
their individual differences, and not because of their sex or gender.
II.

Impressions of ERA Dangers by Some Opponents

Aside from the uncertainty as to the standard of justification that
the Amendment would impose upon sex-based classifications, other
perceived consequences of the Amendment have led to considerable
opposition to its passage. For example, from the time the ERA was
first making its way through the Congressional process which led to the
joint resolution sending it to the states for ratification, it was clear that
a crucial and highly eniotional issue engendered by the proposal was
whether women would, as a result of the Amendment, be subject to the
same duty of compulsory military service that had previously been the
lot of male members of our society in times of international crisis.
ERA opponents claimed that women would be subject to the draft.
ERA proponents were somewhat divided in their position on this issue,
some claiming that they would be, others that they would not.
My own position, maintained throughout the entire period, has
been that the clear impact of the Amendment would require women to
be subjected to the same burdens as men vis-a-vis their government,
and that they would be subject to the draft whenever one was instituted, just as they would be entitled to the same benefits flowing from
military service as male members of the armed services.' This does
not mean, of course, that women would be drafted in the same num42. See Hearings on S.. Res. 61 and SJ Res. 231 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1970) (testimony of L. Kanowitz) [hereinafter cited as
1970 Hearings].
43. See id. at 298-99 (testimony of T. Emerson).
44. See Hale & Kanowitz, Women and the Draft: A Response to Critics of the Equal
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bers as men. The armed services could continue to impose minimal
physical requirements for various kinds of military occupations. That
fact plus the general differences in the male and female physiques, produced in part by social conditioning, and, perhaps, genetic factors, suggest that, were a draft reinstituted and were it sex-neutral in its
operation, many more men than women would find themselves in the
armed services on a compulsory basis.
Opposition to the potential draftability of women undoubtedly reflects a concern that it could lead to the sending of women to foreign
battlefields where they would face all the horrors of combat. My response to this-the only one that, in my opinion, makes sense in the
context of the ERA debate-is that having our youth torn apart by
enemy shrapnel is equally horrendous whether the victims are male or
female; that our relative equanimity in the face of this prospect periodically faced by the young male members of our society, and our consternation at the thought of this happening to female members of our
society, is unfair, irrational, and reveals the fundamental sexist bias of
the society at large in the basic realm of a life and death issue.45
Whether we should ever have a draft at all, I suggested, is an entirely
distinct question from whether, if we do have a draft, women and men
may be treated unequally.
That position will, in my opinion, ultimately prevail. Given
enough time to overcome the emotional biases triggered by the possibility of drafting American women into the armed forces, especially in
time of war, most Americans will come to understand the need to do
this if the promise of our nation's greatness is to be fulfilled. Still, I do
not doubt that the complexity of this issue coupled with its emotionality
has caused many people to oppose the ERA who might otherwise have
supported it wholeheartedly.
A second emotionally-charged issue stemming from the ERA is
whether it would result in depriving wives of the right to the financial
support from their husbands that they appear to enjoy under existing
legal doctrine, both during the ongoing marriage and, in the form of
alimony, when marriages are dissolved by divorce or a comparable
Rights Amendment, 23 HASTINGS LJ. 199 (1971); Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and
the Military, 82 YALE L.J. 1533 (1973).
45. See Kanowitz, The Male Stake in Women's Liberation,8 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 424,
429 (1972). The court in United States v. Reiser, note 19 supra,at 1062 noted that women
"will never accomplish total equality unless they are allowed to accept the concomitant obligations of citizenship," (i.e., compulsory military service). See also Brown, Emerson, Falk &
Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasisfor EqualRightsfor Women, 80 YALE L. 871, 873-74 (1971).
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proceeding. The answers to these fears are clear, though once again
they require explanation. In the ongoing marriage, the wife's right to
support is more theoretical than real, most courts refusing to fix the
amount and frequency of support because of the administrative
problems doing so would create, so long as the bare minima of existence are being maintained.4 6 As for post-marital support, even without
the ERA, the proposed Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 47 versions

of which have already been adopted by many states, 48 requires the issue to be determined on a sex-neutral basis, the judicial inquiry being
limited to ascertaining the financial needs and abilities of the parties to
the marriage. 49 And only 15 days ago, the United States Supreme

Court reached a similar conclusion when it invalidated on equal protection grounds a state law permitting alimony awards to wives but not
to husbands.50 That such an approach is more equitable than the traditional one should be self-evident. This too is, in my view, a conclusion
that will be ultimately reached by most people who think about the
46. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953).
47. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, § 308 (1973).

48. California has adopted a version of the Uniform Act. CAL. CIr. CODE § 4801 (West
Supp. 1978) (amended 1976), for example, provides that the following circumstances shall be
considered by the court in determining whether, and in what amount, support payments
shall be ordered: "(1) The earning capacity and needs of each spouse. (2) The obligations
and assets, including the separate property, of each. (3) The duration of the marriage. (4)
The ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful employment without interfering
with the interests of dependent children in the custody of the spouse. (5) The time required
for the supported spouse to acquire appropriate education, training, and employment. (6)
The age and health of the parties. (7) The standard of living of the parties. (8) Any other
factors which it deems just and equitable."
49. The Uniform Act indirectly discourages maintenance awards by preferring allocation of property to the parties to provide necessary support. Maintenance payments may be
awarded only if the Court finds that the spouse seeking maintenance: "(1) lacks sufficient
property to provide for his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support himself through
appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances
make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the
home. (b) The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for periods of time as the
court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant
factors including: (I) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including
marital property apportioned to him, his ability to meet his needs independently, and the
extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for
that party as custodian; (2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment: (3) the standard of
living established during the marriage; (4) the duration of the marriage: (5) the age and the
physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; and (6) the ability of
the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the
spouse seeking maintenance." UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 308, 435-36
(1973). See also Goodman, Oberman & Wheat, Rights and Obligationsof Child Support, 7
Sw. U.L. REv. 36 (1975).
50. Orr v. Orr, 47 U.S.L.W. 4224 (1929).
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problem. Nevertheless, this issue also has proved to be a stumbling
block to garnering universal and total support for the ERA.
Still another fundamental concern that has engendered some opposition to the ERA is the fear that, following its adoption, the existing
preferences for mothers over fathers in disputes over the custody of
minor children will be abrogated.5 Again, I cannot refute this analysis
of the ERA opponents as to the Amendment's probable effect. Where
they are wrong, however, is in the premise upon which they base their
further conclusion that this effect provides a proper reason for opposing
the ERA. It simply assumes that, all other things being equal, it is
right, just, fair, and proper to prefer mothers over fathers at all times in
custody disputes solely on the basis of their sex. 2 A moment's reflection will reveal the illogic of that position. That fathers are capable of
maintaining, and should be encouraged to maintain, meaningful relationships with their children is a self-evident proposition. Social science research suggests, moreover, that this would have a profoundly
ameliorative effect upon such problems in American society as crime
and delinquency, let alone confusions about sexuality. Once again, developments under existing constitutional provisions suggest that the
courts, as well as lawyers and their clients, are becoming increasingly
aware of these factors;53 the presumption favoring mothers as custodians of children of tender years has recently been discarded in many
states.5 4 But, like the other issues mentioned earlier, this one too has
engendered much emotional anti-ERA sentiment.
An issue that has plagued the ERA campaign from the beginning
has been its potential effect upon state protective laws that have previously applied to women workers only. This caused initial opposition to
the Amendment from leaders of organized labor. They believed that
the hard-won gains for women workers in many states, such as weightlifting restrictions, 55 minimum wage guarantees, 56 and maximum hours
51. This attitude was formerly embodied in statutory law. See former CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 138(2), note 14 supra.
52. See comment on Georgia law preferring unwed mothers to unwed fathers, note 14
supra.
53. See, e.g., Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 285 (1973) (presumption that mother should
have custody of children of tender years violated state law and was unconstitutional). See
also Foster & Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 423 (1964); Podell, Peck & First,
Custody-To hich Parent?,56 MARQ. UNIV. L. REV. 51 (1972).
54. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) (West Supp. 1979), as amended by 1972 Cal.
Stats., ch. 1007, § 1, deleting the former language which stated: "but, other things being
equal, custody shall be given to the mother if the child is of tender years." See note 14
supra.
55. See, e.g., Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1093-94 (S.D. Ohio
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provisions,5 7 would all be lost as a result of the Amendment. My own

position, I must admit, was at one time lukewarm on the Amendment
precisely because of my concerns about its potential effects in this
area." Only after my own research convinced me that the application
of these laws to women only was the result of historical accident, and
that the way was open to achieve sex equality in this realm by extending the benefit of such laws to both sexes without sacrificing those
hard-won social gains, did I wholeheartedly and enthusiastically support the Amendment.5 9 At the same time, there is no doubt that apprehensions about the possible effects of the ERA upon women-only state
protective labor laws have turned many a potential ERA supporter into
an opponent. Again, with enough time to explore this complex issue in
the course of the national debate, many if not most of those opponents
will undoubtedly be persuaded to change their minds.
Finally, a substantive objection to the ERA, which did not arise
until the Amendment came up for consideration before various state
legislatures, has been based on Section 2 which, you will recall, provides that "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Though similar language
appears in other constitutional amendments, most notably the crucial
Fourteenth, ERA opponents soon began to raise the alarm that it
would permit the federal government to interfere with state control of
areas that have historically been regarded as exclusively of state concern. These areas include marriage and family laws, abortion, childparent, and husband-wife relationships. The specter of the giant, impersonal and remote Washington bureaucracy making decisions that
vitally affect such questions in Arizona, Nevada, Georgia and South
Carolina has inevitably aroused additional opposition from certain sections of those states' populations.
1971). State statutes restricting employment of females in factories were held in conflict
with, and superseded by, equal employment opportunities provisions of 1964 Civil Rights
Act, which prohibit discrimination in employment unless sex is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to normal operation of business.
56. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, ANALYSIS OF COVERAGE AND
WAGE RATES OF STATE MINIMUM WAGE LAWS AND ORDERS,passim (Bulletin 291, Aug. 1,
1965).
57. See, e.g., Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1092-94 (S.D. Ohio
1971).
58. See KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 4, at 192-96.
59. See 1970 Hearings,supra note 42, at 161, 172-74. That research apparently contributed, along with pressure from rank-and-file women members of the organized labor movement, to a dramatic turnabout in the position of the AFL-CIO leadership who, for these last
six or seven years, have been among the most active and influential ERA supporters.
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But here too, the spuriousness of this anti-ERA argument can be
seen if one but casts a glance at the already enormous power of the
national Congress to legislate in almost unlimited fashion in almost unlimited areas, as a result of the Supreme Court's expansive interpretations of the commerce clause, 60 among other constitutional
provisions. 6 1 That Congress has not legislated about marriage and divorce, husband and wife, and children and parent relationships, does
not, in my opinion, result from an absence of Congressional power to
do so. Rather, it reflects two fundamental political facts. One is that
Congress has much else to occupy its attention. The other is that members of the House of Representatives and United States Senate are
elected by voters of separate states; they are, therefore, ultimately responsible, politically speaking, to the wishes and desires of their constituents within the states. Section 2 of the ERA therefore would not
confer any powers on Congress that it does not already enjoy. Nevertheless, once again, this perception of a possible ERA effect has contributed to some opposition to the Amendment.
These, then, are the bases for some of the principal substantive
objections to the Amendment. Whether the objections are based on
major or minor considerations, there are, as I have tried to demonstrate, principled, logical, and dispositive answers that can be and often
have been brought to bear by the Amendment's supporters. Those answers, unfortunately, have not always been communicated, partly because many ERA opponents have refused "to be confused by the
facts." Others, though willing to listen, have often found it hard to
understand because of the complexities and legal technicalities that are
unavoidably involved in those answers.
Despite such difficulties, public opinion polls demonstrate that
most Americans support ERA ratification. 62 Among these supporters
60. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Title II of Civil Rights Act
of 1964, § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964), which prohibits discrimination in places of public
accommodation, was held to be within the Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce as applied to a small restaurant that served mostly local patrons. The Katzenbach
Court held that the restaurant was sufficiently connected with interstate commerce to justify
Congressional exercise of power because a substantial portion of the food served in the
restaurant had moved in interstate commerce. See also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971), where sufficient connection was found between purely local "loan-sharking" and
interstate crime to sustain regulation and prohibition by Congress of such activities in Title
II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, § 201, 18 U.S.C. § 891 etseq. (Supp. V 1964). The
law is based on the Congressional finding that local extortionate credit transactions adversely affect interstate commerce.
61. See, ag., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
62. A 1975 Gallup Poll revealed that 58% of those interviewed favored the Amendment,
while only 24% were opposed. A 1976 Gallup Poll produced similar results, with 57% in
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are undoubtedly many who understand the issues in all their complexity and who have made considered decisions that the costs of not ratifying the Amendment far outweigh the benefits that might flow from its
ratification. At the same time, there are probably many who, as counterparts to ERA opponents, intuitively feel that a constitutional amendment guaranteeing equality of the sexes under law is desirable, while
not necessarily perceiving all its complexities and technicalities, or even
making the effort to do so.
III.

Tactical Errors by Some ERA Proponents

Notwithstanding the overwhelming support for the ERA, however, it still has not been ratified within the original seven-year period.
Why? For one thing, because of the concerns mentioned earlier, as
unfounded as they might be, much of the opposition to the Amendment has been as determined as the support for it. For another, the
amending process was deliberately made difficult by the framers of the
Federal Constitution. Not only must the joint resolution sending the
Amendment on its ratification road be adopted by the extraordinary
majority of two-thirds of each house of Congress, but it has to be ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures, i.e., 38 of the 50.63 The
result is that a determined, well-organized opposition can effectively
block a proposed amendment. And in the case of the ERA, the opposition has been decidedly determined and well-organized.
Not coincidentally, refusal to ratify has occurred chiefly in the
states of the old Confederacy, and in the states where the Mormon
Church, a principal foe of the Amendment, has been extremely influential.6 4 For many, the ERA has been merely part of a larger battle between "conservatives" and "liberals."
Here, I must allude to some over-all tactical errors of certain sections-at times the most visible and vocal sections--of the women's
rights movement that have also contributed to the failure to achieve the
ERA's ratification within the original seven years. At one stage of, but
favor and 24 % opposed. THm GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1972-77 447, 684 (G. GALLUP ed. 1978).
63. The amending process of the federal constitution is set forth in art. 5: "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution... which... shall be valid ... as Part of this Constitution,
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States ....
64. Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina. Virginia, Arkansas
and Oklahoma are among the southern states that have not ratified. Utah, center of the
Mormon Church, has not ratified. Tennessee, Nebraska and Idaho have purported to rescind. See note 3 supra.
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to some extent throughout, the campaign for the Amendment, many of
its supporters have conveyed the strong impression-at times unwittingly, at other times deliberately-that they regard women who work
in the home and who do not hold jobs in the world outside as being
somehow less worthy human beings than those who do hold such jobs.
To the extent that this view has been associated with support for the
ERA, it has inevitably engendered opposition from women who sincerely and honestly believe that they can fulfill themselves in the roles
of wife and mother-though they might have welcomed the views of
the vast majority of ERA proponents that they should have a choice in
such matters, and that they should not be forced into such roles by laws
and governmental actions. But, as I have suggested, that view held by
a majority of ERA supporters has often not been nearly as visible or
discernible as the view of a minority of other ERA supporters which, to
employ the vernacular, simply turned many people off.
Another error committed by some elements in the women's rights
movement has been to allow the impression to take hold that adoption
of the ERA will, somehow, legitimize homosexual relationships under
American law and in American society. I hesitate to speak for others,
but I suspect that many of the people who originally testified on behalf
of the ERA before various congressional committees-in my case
before both the United States Senate Judiciary Committee65 and the
United States House Judiciary Committee 66-- share my belief that it is
high time that state and federal governments take their feet off the
necks of people whose sexual preferences differ from those of the majority. But, for a very simple reason, we did not suggest to the members
of Congress before whom we appeared that this goal was to be
achieved by adoption of the ERA. That reason was our perception that
it was going to be an enormously difficult task to persuade legislators
and citizens alike simply to examine their longstanding prejudices
about fixed roles for men and women in law and society. To add to it
the burden of persuading them to revise their attitudes about what
many perceived to be sexual deviationism, in the context of a campaign
for the ERA, would simply make that task much more difficult, if not
impossible.
Moreover, there were promising developments with respect to the
rights of homosexuals under other existing provisions of the federal
65. See notes 59 and 42 supra.
66. See Hearingson H.J Res. 35 & 208 and H. 916 Before the House Comnm on the
Judiciary,92d Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1971) (testimony of L. Kanowitz).
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constitution. 67 Therefore, as I understood it-and I assume the others
shared my views-to introduce the homosexuality issue into the ERA
campaign was simply to load that campaign with an issue that, though
admittedly related, was sufficiently tangential and emotionally-charged
to require its separation from the question of equal treatment of the
sexes under law. But the impression created by the words and actions
of many ERA proponents that the ERA will achieve so-called "gay
liberation" has inevitably hardened the opposition of those who are
already inclined to oppose the ERA, and has turned many a potential
supporter of the Amendment into an opponent.
Still another tactical shortcoming has been that, despite the recognition by most thoughtful members of the women's rights movement
that both men and women have been victims of a social and legal system that arbitrarily assigns roles on the basis of sex, some women have
conveyed the impression that the fundamental issue involves a struggle
by women against men. Thus, many men, potential allies in this struggle for fundamental human rights, have been deterred from lending
their support by what they perceive as the ERA's threat to their own
self-interest as a result of the context within which some pro-ERA activists have waged the campaign for the Amendment.
Finally, the abortion issue, though related to the question of women's rights in a very direct sense, has never really been involved in
either the text or the potential impact of the ERA. Nevertheless, many
opponents of an unlimited right to abortion-an issue that is perceived
one way if attention is focused upon the right of a woman to control
her own body, but another way if the rights of a foetus or the value to
be assigned to the potentiality of life of the foetus is one's central concern-have associated the abortion question with the ERA. Because of
their strong anti-abortion stand, often based on deeply felt religious
and moral conviction, their ability to judge the ERA on its merits has
been greatly impaired.
These have been, in my view, some of the major factors that have
kept the ERA from being ratified within the first seven years. They
67. See W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (1973). Attacks

against statutes prohibiting homosexuality and homosexual acts have been raised on several
constitutional grounds: under the right to privacy stemming from the Bill of Rights,
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated andremandedforreconsideration on constitutionalgrounds sub non. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971); that
criminal statutes proscribing sodomy are void for vagueness, Hogan v. State, 84 Nev. 372,
441 P.2d 620 (1968); and that sodomy laws are an establishment of religion in violation of
the First Amendment establishment clause, State v. Rinehart, 70 Wash. 2d 649,424 P.2d 906
(1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967).
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were by no means the only ones. For example, the extraordinary threefifths majority vote of its legislators required by Illinois to ratify a federal constitutional amendment 6 8-a requirement that is not without its
own constitutional problems-has undoubtedly been another contributing factor, especially if Illinois' strategic importance and the likely
effect its ratification might have had on other undecided states is considered. The opponents' concentration of their efforts in the most
promising states-considered from their viewpoint-also played a part.
So did the organizational effectiveness of the anti-ERA leadership.
And, finally, there is the effect of the news media, which have often
delighted in featuring the antics of some fringe elements of the women's rights movement because this made good copy, while often ignoring the positions of the vast majority of participants in that
movement which were thoughtful, sophisticated, and cogent.
IV.

Some Achievements of the Campaign to Date

Having examined some of the more important reasons why the
ERA has not yet been ratified, I would now like to discuss the positive
results produced by the pro-ERA campaign to date. For one thing, the
35 state ratifications garnered so far will of course be crucial if the remaining three ratifications are obtained within the next 39 months. For
another, the pro-ERA efforts during these past seven years have undoubtedly contributed to the changed jurisprudence of the United
States Supreme Court on the subject of sex discrimination and the existing provisions of the United States Constitution. Nor was the Court
the only institution in American life to develop a new understanding of
the sex role issue during these last seven years. The Congress, the state
legislatures, the state courts, and, above all, the American people, now
entertain views about the roles of men and women in our society that
are fundamentally different from, and decidedly more progressive than,
the views they had when the campaign to ratify the Amendment was
first launched.
At the Supreme Court level, when the start of the ratification process became imminent, the case of Reed v. Reed6 9 was decided. It invalidated, as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
guarantee, an Idaho statute that preferred women over similarly situated men for appointment as administrators of dead persons' estates.
Though purporting to apply the "any-rational-basis" test that had pre68. ILL. CONST. art. 14, § 4.
69. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 6:637

vailed in past sex discrimination cases, the Court, both in its result and

in some of its language, left the strong impression that it was applying a
more stringent standard in judging this sex-based classification than
any it had previously applied.
That the Court had in fact done this in Reed soon became apparent in another decision, Frontiero v. Richardson,7 ° invalidating, under
the equal-protection aspect of the Fifth Amendment's due process

clause, federal statutes providing greater benefits to male members of
the armed services than to female members. In Frontiero,four members of the Court expressly adopted the suspect-classification analysis

for classifications based upon sex.7 1 This test, you will recall, imposes a
much more burdensome and difficult standard of justification upon one
who seeks to sustain the classification than does the any-rational-basis

test for equal protection purposes that is applied to ordinary economic
and social legislation. Had the views of these four members of the
Court become the majority view, sex classifications would now be
treated in the same manner as classifications based upon race, national
origin, and alienage. They could be supported only by a showing that
they are necessary to achieve an overwhelming or compelling govern-

mental interest. But four members of the Court do not a majority
make. The result in Frontiero was reached only because it was concurred in by another member of the Court, Justice Stewart, in a short,

cryptic opinion which did not embrace the suspect characterization of
sex-based classifications.72
70. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
71. Id. at 682, 688.
72. Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment and joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun, interpreted the meaning of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment in the
opposite sense from that adopted by the plurality opinion in Froniero. Id. at 691. The
plurality cited passage of the Equal Rights Amendment resolution as support for its finding
that classifications based on sex are inherently invidious. Id. at 687. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated that the court should defer categorizing sex classifications as suspect due to the pendency of the Equal Rights Amendment. He expressed the view that the
amendatory process is the proper manner in which to embody proscription of sex classifications as "suspect": "By acting prematurely and unnecessarily, as I view it, the Court has
assumed a decisional responsibility at the very time when state legislatures, functioning
within the traditional democratic process, are debating the proposed Amendment. It seems
to me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major political decision which is
currently in process of resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed
legislative processes.
"There are times when this Court, under our system, cannot avoid a constitutional decision on issues which normally should be resolved by the elected representatives of the people. But democratic institutions are weakened, and confidence in the restraint of the Court
is impaired, when we appear unnecessarily to decide sensitive issues of broad social and
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Finally, in Craigv. Boren,73 a Court majority endorsed a level of
scrutiny of sex-based classifications that falls somewhere between the

any-rational-basis test that had previously prevailed in this area and
the suspect classification, heightened scrutiny of the compelling governmental interest test.74 Craig also established that discrimination di-

rected against males because of their sex or gender is just as
constitutionally vulnerable as that directed against females if the new
test is not satisfied.

Along with these decisions, the Court, in several other cases, held
that if the purpose of a law-imposed classification was to grant a preference to women in order to correct the present effects of past discrimina-

tion, such a preference, or benign discrimination, is constitutionally
permissible. The leading case for this proposition is Kahn v. Shevin,7 6
upholding a Florida tax-exemption for widows though no similar ex-

emption was provided for widowers in that state. In that case, two
members of the Court suggest that men, unlike women, have not been
the victims of past sex discrimination. 77 That view, I suggest, is short-

sighted. It fails to appreciate that whether one talks of the male's
unique obligation of compulsory military service, his primary duty for
spousal and child support, or his lack of the same kinds of protective
labor legislation that have traditionally been enjoyed by women, he has

paid an awesome price for other advantages he has presumably enjoyed over women in our society.
Significantly, the "benign discrimination" which the Court permitpolitical importance at the very time they are under consideration within the prescribed
constitutional processes." Id. at 692.
As noted in the discussion of Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), see notes 73-77 and
82-83 and accompanying text supra, members of the plurality in Frontiero subsequently
retreated from their view that sex classifications are "suspect."
73. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
74. The standard of scrutiny was formulated as follows: "To withstand constitutional
challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
Id. at 197. For a discussion of "middle tier" analysis from its inception in Reed, see Gunther, The Supreme Court,1971 Term-Foreward-In Search ofEvol'ing Doctrineon a Changing Court: A Modelfor -4Newer EqualProtection,86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
75. 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see also Orr v. Orr, 47 U.S.L.W. 4224 (1979).
76. 416 U.S. 351 (1974); see also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
77. "While doubtless some widowers are in financial need, no one suggests that such
need results from sex discrimination as in the case of widows." 416 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 219 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting):
"There is no suggestion in the Court's opinion that males in this age group are in any way
peculiarly disadvantaged, subject to systematic discriminatory treatment, or otherwise in
need of special solicitude from the courts."
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ted on behalf of women in the face of due process and equal protection
challenges under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has not been
allowed when the issue confronting the Court was whether a state medical school could constitutionally prefer black people over white people
solely on the basis of race in its admissions policies, absent a record of
any prior racial discrimination by that school.7" Were the ERA to become part of the Constitution, moreover, the "benign" sex discrimination allowed in such cases as Kahn v. Shevin7 9 and Calffano v.

Webster80 would, in my opinion, be impermissible, since its prohibition
against unequal treatment on the basis of sex is absolute.8 ' That the
ERA is perceived as having this effect is no doubt cause for the opposition to the Amendment from some Americans who believe that the
law's remaining preferences for women should be preserved.
Despite the Court's uneven record in the sex discrimination area
during the past seven years, caused chiefly by its benign discrimination
doctrine, it has dramatically improved its performance over what it was
at the start of the period. In cases in which women or men can be
shown to be subject to differential treatment by the law, such treatment
can now be sustained only if it satisifies the heightened level of scrutiny
prescribed by Craig v. Boren.8 In the Court's words in that case: "To
classifications by gender must
withstand constitutional challenge
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."8 3 While this burden of justification is not as great as I and other equal-rights advocates would like,
being less onerous than the one applied in race discrimination cases
and much less than would be required by the ERA, it nevertheless rep78. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Technically, Bakke was
not a constitutional decision, since only Justice Powell held that a numerical quota based on
race, even if aimed at correcting the present effects of past societal discrimination, violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. The Court's invalidation of the
quota was achieved, however, because four other members of the court held that it violated
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
79. 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (widows could constitutionally be granted property tax exemption, but not widowers, because loss of husband imposes greater financial impact than loss of
wife).
80. 430 U.S. 313 (1977). Webster held constitutional a statute allowing women to subtract three more lower earning years than males, as it helped remedy the effects of past
discrimination when women applied for social security benefits.
81. But see Marchioro v. Chaney, 47 U.S.L.W. 2090 (1978) (Washington Supreme
Court) (A Washington statute which requires that both sexes be equally represented on political party state committees, and that chairman and vice-chairman of state committees be
of opposite sexes, does not violate the state constitution's equal rights amendment.)
82. 429 U.S. at 197. See note 74 supra.
83. 429 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added).
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resents a significant step forward from the "any-rational-basis" test that
had prevailed at the beginning of the ratification campaign. This new
standard will have the practical effect of invalidating numerous sex discriminatory laws and official practices that would have passed constitutional muster under the earlier doctrine.
That this progress by the Court-as incomplete as it has beenwas prompted in large part by the pro-ERA campaign appears selfevident. To be sure, other developments in the campaign for sex equality, aside from the pro-ERA efforts, also contributed to the changed
perceptions by members of the Court. Indeed, various members of the
Court have candidly acknowledged the fact that we are living in a new
day insofar as society's views on sex-roles are concerned."4 And Justice
Powell, while drawing a negative inference from the fact, also has admitted that the campaign to ratify the ERA is a factor to be considered
in deciding whether to give the existing constitutional provisions a
more important role in sex discrimination cases.8" While his conclusion has been that the Court should tread carefully in this area because
the American people will be making the fundamental political decision
about sex equality under the Constitution when they either ratify or fail
to ratify the ERA, 86 it is clear that other members of the Court understand that the pro-ERA drive has been made necessary by the Court's
prior grudging application of existing constitutional provisions to the
problems of sex discrimination and the law. Their new rulings in sex
discrimination cases have been heading in the direction, although falling far short of the goal, of making the ERA a constitutional redundancy-a development I had looked forward to when testifying in
support of the ERA in Congress. 7
In speaking of the effect of the pro-ERA campaign upon the
Supreme Court, one must recognize that this effect followed anothernamely the one upon the understanding of the American people themselves. Only after Americans were persuaded of the rightness of equal
treatment without regard to sex as a social principle did their convictions filter down (or up) to members of the Court.
Although I cannot document this, my life's experience has convinced me that people learn best under stress. One can cajole and try to
84. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 537 (1975).
85. See Justice Powell's concurrence in the judgment in Frontiero v. Richardson, discussed at note 72 supra.
86. Id.
87. See 1970 Hearings, supra note 42, at 164.
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persuade in calm, dispassionate tones with limited results. But the
same arguments made in the context of a hard-fought contest over a
social or political issue seem to be perceived with greater intensity by
those to whom they are directed. As mentioned earlier,"8 more than the
ERA campaign has been occurring in recent years to heighten people's
consciousness about sex roles in American society. But the ERA has
been a central theme around which other efforts have often been mobilized.
Nor has the changed jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court in applying existing constitutional provisions to sex discrimination cases been the only positive effect of the national ERA campaign.
Equal-rights provisions, many tracking the language of the proposed
federal ERA, are now contained in the constitutions of at least 16
states.89 Though some antedated the ERA-ratification-campaign, most
were adopted after the campaign was started, and were undoubtedly
inspired by it. Having personally participated in the successful efforts
to adopt an equal-rights amendment to the New Mexico Constitution,90
I can attest to the close links between the national campaign and the
one directed toward achieving a state equal-rights constitutional guarantee.
What is more, during the entire period of the ERA campaign, inportant gains for the principle of sex-based equality were made through
new laws enacted by Congress and the state legislatures. To be sure,
the 1963 Equal Pay Act,9 1 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,92 and
the amendment of Executive Order 12246 by Order 11375, 91 all of
which outlawed various forms of sex discrimination in employment,
preceded the ratification phase of the ERA campaign. Still, they coincided with the heightened efforts to shepherd the ERA through Congress that occurred during those years. Since the ratification phase of
88. See text accompanying notes 38 and 39 supra.
89. ALAS. CONST. art. I, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20;
HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18; MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 46;
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; N.H. CONST. Pt. I, art. 2d; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; PA. CONST.
art. I § 28; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 3a; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11;
WASH. CONST. art. 31, §§ 1, 2; WYO. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3. See Kurtz, The State Equal
RightsAmendments and Their Impact on Domestic Relations Law, 11 FAM. L. Q. 101 (1977).

90. See generally Symposiun

The New Mexico EqualRights Amendment-Assessing Its

Impact, 3 N.M. L. REv. 1-135 (1973).

91. Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963)).
92. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1964)).
93.

Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), as amendedby Exec. Order No.

13,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967); 30 Fed. Reg. 12,935 (1965), as amended by Exec. Order
No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967).
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the ERA campaign began, moreover, new legislation such as Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972,1 4 the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, 95 and many other legislative attacks on sex discriminatory laws
and practices, have been enacted.

V. The Years Ahead
To this point, we have been examining developments of the past
seven years. The question now is what does the future hold for the

principle of sex equality under American law? Specifically, what is the
likely future course of the United States Supreme Court decisions in

this field, and what are the prospects for ratification of the ERA within
the next 39 months?

In my opinion, certain members of the Court may conclude that
the temporary setback suffered by the ERA signifies the American people's rejection of the principle of equality of the sexes under the law.

Such a conclusion, I suggest, would be mistaken. It would fail to take
into account the evidence of the public opinion polls referred to

above. 96 What is more important is that it would ignore the feelings of
large numbers of pro-equality advocates who have been persuaded by

ERA opponents that a new constitutional provision is unnecessary because the Court has already embarked upon a vigorous application of
existing constitutional provisions to sex discrimination issues. Their
opposition has therefore been based upon their assumption-nurtured
by many anti-ERA leaders-that the ERA is unnecessary because the

Court can-indeed must-guarantee sex equality under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the due-process

clause of the Fifth Amendment, among other existing constitutional
provisions. And, of course, with the additional 39 months allotted by
Congress for the ratification process to go forward, the Amendment
cannot be said to have been rejected by the American people.9 7
94. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, § 901, 86 Stat. 373
(amending 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1970)). Section 901(a) of Title IX (20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(1976)) provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. . . ." See Bueck &
Orleans, Sex Discrimination-4Bar to a DemocraticEducation: Overview of Title IX of the
EducationAmendments of1972, 6 CONN. L. Rnv. 1 (1973).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1961 etseq. (1976).
96. See note 62 supra.
97. The validity of the 39-month extension will undoubtedly be the subject of future
litigation in view of the conflicting opinions of constitutional-law experts expressed during
Congressional hearings on the extension. See Report of the Judiciary Committee on the
Proposed Equal Rights Amendment Extension, 95th Congress, 2d session, House of Repre-
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Nine years ago, testifying in support of the ERA before the United
States Senate Judiciary Committee, I stated that, "even after the adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment, the crucial factor will continue to
be the responsiveness of the judiciary to the social impulse toward
equal treatment without regard to sex." 98 I continue to believe that.
The need for intensive political activity seeking equal treatment without regard to sex will be as crucial in the years ahead as it has been in
the past. Such activity will obviously occur on many fronts. But what
better rallying point to guarantee that such activity will be sustained
than the continued efforts on behalf of the ERA.
Above all, it is crucial that such activity be intensified by those
who understand the fundamental issue as being one of ending discrimination against women andmen solely because of their sex. They should
make sure that the American public understands the issue in these
terms, rather than as one involving a battle of the sexes. At the same
time, they should take care not to becloud the remaining months of the
ERA campaign with issues-no matter how meritorious they might be
in their own right-that are extraneous to the ERA's fundamental aims
and that unnecessarily deter potential allies from joining in the campaign.
If this is done, we can look forward with some confidence to the
creation of a truly sex-neutral society in our country that will inspire
the rest of the world; a society in which the original promise of
America's greatness will have come much closer to fulfillment; a society
in which, because of the demonstrated relationship between rigid sex
role stratification and the tendency toward human aggression, 99 family
relations will be improved, crime and delinquency diminished, and violent solutions to disputes between nations less likely to be sought.

sentatives, Report No. 95-1405 (August 1, 1978). The principal arguments by the opponents
of the extension have been that it required a two-thirds vote of Congress, rather than a mere
majority, even if Congress had the power to change the required time limit. The opponents
of extension further argued that, in any event, the original seven-year limit for ratification
was immutable. More persuasive to Congress, however, were the arguments of the advocates of extension that since the original time-limit was not contained in the body of the
amendment itself, but appeared only in the proposal, Congress retained authority to review
the limit should circumstances warrant, and that for the same reasons, only a simple majority vote, rather than a two-thirds vote, was required on the extension question. Regardless
of the ultimate determination of this question as a matter of law, it is clear that the extension
will be perceived by many people as a species of rule-changing after the game has started,
thereby presenting an additional obstacle to ratification during the extended period.
98. See 1970 Hearings, supra note 42, at 166.
99. See L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW, supranote 4, at 197.

